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Abstract
This paper examines the question of whether inflation targeting monetary policy is an
appropriate framework for sub-Saharan African countries. The paper presents an
overview of inflation targeting, reviews the justification for the regime, and summarizes
some major critiques. Monetary policy responses to inflation depend on the source of
inflationary pressures. Therefore, the determinants of inflation in African countries are
investigated, using dynamic panel data, and the implications for inflation targeting are
discussed. These issues are examined in greater detail for the two African countries
which have formally adopted inflation targeting, South Africa and Ghana. The analysis is
placed in the context of the global economic crisis. The paper concludes with a
discussion of alternative approaches to monetary policies and the institutional constraints
that would need to be addressed to allow central banks to play a stronger developmental
role in sub-Saharan African countries.
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1. Introduction
Inflation targeting is increasingly seen as the ‘best practice’ for central bank
policy in many economies around the world, including a growing number of developing
countries. To date, inflation targeting has not made inroads into African economies, with
only Ghana and South Africa having formally adopted this policy regime. However, as
the practice of inflation-targeting spreads, it raises a number of questions for African
countries. Is an inflation-targeting regime the right approach to monetary policy, if the
long-run goal is to support economic development and to reduce poverty? Can inflation
targeting adapt to the structural realities of African economies? What are some of the
potential pitfalls to inflation targeting? Are there viable alternatives? This paper grapples
with these questions and raises a number of pertinent issues that should be taken into
account in choosing the right monetary policy regime for long-run growth and
development in Africa.
The issue of inflation targeting as a monetary policy regime has assumed even
higher relevance in African countries as they attempt to respond to the impact of the
global economic crisis which began to unfold in the second half of 2008. Unlike in
previous crises, the majority of African countries entered this crisis from a much stronger
footing in terms of macroeconomic stability thanks to efforts undertaken over the past
decades to implement painful macroeconomic and trade reforms (AfDB, UNECA, and
OECD 2009). These reforms have helped reduce inflation to single digits in most
countries, reduced fiscal and current account deficits, and contributed to gradual
improvement in the investment climate, a key factor to the resurgence in private capital
inflows observed before the crisis. When the crisis hit African economies through its
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second round effects, African governments responded with a combination of measures to
sustain domestic demand and support industrial production. Chief among these measures
has been the easing of monetary policy through reduction of the policy rate, injection of
liquidity in the system and intervention in the foreign exchange markets to influence the
value of the national currency (see AfDB 2009a, 2009b; Kasekende, Brixiova, and
Ndikumana 2010).
The ability of the central banks to respond swiftly has been critical in the efforts
to alleviate the impact of the crisis. Central banks’ responses have been guided primarily
by pragmatism rather than adherence to any prescribed policy regimes. Even in South
Africa, where the inflation rate broke the inflation target range of 3-6 percent to reach
double digits over several months, the Reserve Bank and Treasury have responded
flexibly with a combination of fiscal stimulus and easing of the monetary policy stance,
with an aim of supporting domestic economic activity. The crisis has clearly
demonstrated both the powerful role of counter-cyclical policy and the advantages of
flexibility in monetary policy in responding to exogenous shocks. This experience must
inform any discussion of adequacy of monetary policy regimes and, for that matter, any
other macroeconomic policy frameworks in the context of African economies. This paper
is an attempt to contribute to this important and timely debate.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present an overview of
inflation targeting, review the justification for this approach to monetary policy, and
summarize some of the major critiques. This initial review will not be restricted to subSaharan Africa, but will draw on the existing literature on inflation targeting more
broadly. Following this overview, we examine inflation dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa,
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with particular attention to the role of exchange rates, the money supply, interest rates,
and supply-side shocks. We present estimates of the determinants of inflation in African
countries, using panel data. We then briefly review the experiences of the two subSaharan African countries which have adopted formal inflation targeting – Ghana and
South Africa. Following this discussion the paper reflects on the current global crisis and
the impact it has had on monetary policy and inflation targets among African countries.
The paper concludes with a discussion of possible alternatives to inflation targeting
monetary policy, whether such alternatives are viable, and the constraints which may
prevent central banks from playing a stronger developmental role.

2. Inflation targeting: an overview of key issues
Inflation targeting, as a formal monetary policy regime, was first introduced in
New Zealand in 1990 and has since been adopted by numerous countries around the
world. Formal inflation targeting is still uncommon in African countries, with only South
Africa and Ghana having officially adopted the framework at the current time. Although
many African countries have inflation targets, they have not implemented a policy of
formal inflation targeting. Inflation targeting involves a declaration of an inflation target
by the central bank – the target is most commonly a narrow range of inflation rates, e.g.,
4-6 percent. The central bank then uses monetary tools, often a policy interest rate, in an
attempt to keep inflation within the targeted range. The inflation targeting framework
stresses increased accountability of the central bank; the central bank must evaluate its
performance in meeting the target and publicly disclose the reasons for any deviation. In
some cases, the adoption of formal inflation targeting has also involved institutional and
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legal changes which increase the independence of the central bank (Epstein and Yeldan,
2008).
If inflation targets were strictly adhered to, inflation targeting would represent a
form of rules-based central banking, in which the scope for discretion is limited. A
common justification for limiting the discretionary scope of central banking is that policy
makers may, in their attempt to reach short-run objectives, increase inflation above a
socially optimal level. The literature on the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy,
first advanced by Kydland and Prescott (1977), represents an influential theoretical
expression of this argument: individuals rationally adapt their expectations in response to
discretionary changes in monetary policy, eliminating any long-run impact on the real
economy. In this framework, rules are preferable, since they eliminate the possibility that
policy makers will respond erroneously to short-run incentives to boost growth or
employment above a long-run equilibrium level. A crucial assumption is that individuals
can distinguish monetary responses (due to central bank policy) from other economic
factors (e.g., inflation due to supply-side shocks) in forming their expectations.
In practice, inflation targeting is often not strictly rules-based, and has been
referred to as a policy of ‘constrained discretion’ or as a monetary policy ‘framework’
(King, 2005; Bernanke et al., 1999). Effectively, this means that the targets represent
rules that can be broken, but with a heighten degree of transparency and accountability.
When inflation targeting central banks fail to meet the target, they must explain what
happened. There is often a gap between the theory and the practice of inflation targeting,
caused by external factors and unexpected changes in the macroeconomic environment.

4

Expectations play a central role in the motivation for inflation targeting policies.
The central idea is that individual expectations will adapt to the targets announced by the
central bank. The hope is that these expectations will then be incorporated into contracts,
pricing practices, and collective bargaining agreements. These changes in expectations
and forward-looking institutional arrangements link the inertial component of inflation
(i.e., inflationary pressures derived from previous inflation rates) to the inflation target.
Unlike the use of monetary tools to manage inflation, which often impose real economic
costs from higher real interest rates or slower credit growth, the change in inertial
inflation would not involve similar costs. Therefore, it is frequently argued that formal
inflation targeting allows inflation to be controlled at lower cost than other approaches to
monetary policy that focus on reducing inflation. Put another way, inflation targeting is
said to reduce the ‘sacrifice ratio’ – the amount of output or employment which must be
forgone to reduce inflation by a certain amount.
Based on available evidence, it is not evident that inflation targeting significantly
reduces the sacrifice ratio or improves the performance of the real economy (Ball and
Sheridan, 2005; Bernanke et al., 1999; Epstein, 2008). There is some evidence that
countries that have adopted inflation targeting have experienced reductions in inflation,
lower volatility of inflation, and a reduced degree of exchange rate pass-through
(Gonçalves and Salles, 2008; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; IMF, 2005). However,
these results are sensitive to the controls used to ascertain the impact of inflation targeting
and are strongest when inflation-targeting countries are compared to their own pretargeting experience (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). Comparing the pre-targeting
period with the post-targeting period may not capture the impact of inflation targeting per
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se, but rather a re-orientation of monetary policy towards lowering inflation (which could
be achieved with or without inflation targeting). Comparisons between inflation-targeting
countries and non-targeting countries are weaker and, again, depend on the control group
used.
Therefore, whether inflation targeting actually changes expectations in a way
which reduces the cost of lowing inflation remains uncertain.4 If inflation targeting does
not have a significant impact on expectations, inflation targeting may not be overly
distinct compared to monetary policy which simply attempts to reduce inflation, or
sustain inflation at low levels. The central banks in many African countries have specific
inflation targets in their policy statements, PRSPs, or national development strategies
(e.g., 5 percent being common at the present time). These inflation targets differ from
formal inflation targeting in that the targets are not accompanied by formal processes for
holding the central bank accountable for reaching the target in an effort to influence
expectations.
Another justification for inflation targeting is that every economy needs a
‘nominal anchor’ which can serve as the basis for making economic decisions (Bernanke
et al., 1999). Without an idea of what the average price level in an economy is (and will
likely be in the future), economic actors cannot accurately discern relative price
4

Bernanke et al. (1999) present evidence that inflation expectations have adjusted in some countries, but
the adjustments have been gradual due to significant inertia. However, the benefits – in terms of lower
sacrifice ratios – were not evident. Ball and Sheridan (2005) present evidence suggesting that there is no
evidence that inflation targeting raises economic growth. While inflation targeters may experience lower
inflation, including inflationary responses to shocks (e.g., Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; IMF, 2005;
Gonçalves and Salles, 2008), the impact on the long-run performance of the real economy remains unclear.
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) present evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting may reduce
an indicator of the combined volatility of output and inflation, but this does not imply that inflation
targeting improves average growth performance. Gonçalves and Salles (2008) also present evidence that
inflation-targeting countries have lower growth volatility relative to a selected group of non-targeters, but
the sample is small (36 observations), the results will be sensitive to large outliers, and there is no clear
justification for the selection of countries included in the non-targeting control group.
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movements and may make errors in allocating resources in response to changing prices.
Historically, devices such as the gold standard provided this anchor. In the absence of a
similar absolute standard, monetary policy must play this role, and inflation targeting
represents one option for establishing a nominal anchor for a market economy.
The fact that the true economic costs of inflation targeting remain uncertain raises
important challenges for policy evaluation. Ideally, we would want to weigh the costs of
inflation targeting against its benefits and thereby determine whether the adoption of
formal inflation targeting is desirable. There is nothing intrinsically desirable about
inflation. If countries in sub-Saharan African countries could experience rapid growth
and development with 2 percent inflation or the same rate of development with 15
percent inflation, it would be rational to choose the lower inflation rate. However, if
maintaining a 2 percent rate of inflation slows the rate of economic development, then it
is unclear whether keeping inflation at that level is the best option.
A common argument for conducting monetary policy so as to keep inflation very
low (e.g., in the lower single digits) is that inflation is harmful to long-run growth. There
are several reasons for this: inflation can raise transactions costs and may contribute to
uncertainty about the future.5 However, there is no consensus in the literature that
maintaining rates of inflation at a typical inflation targeting level (e.g., around 5 percent)
necessarily leads to faster growth.
One early study of the relationship between inflation and growth across 127
countries found that growth rates declined only when inflation rates moved beyond 20-25
percent and that growth increased as inflation rose up to the 15-20 percent range (Bruno,

5

The idea of ‘menu costs,’ such as that advanced by Mankiw (1985), represents the kind of transactions
costs associated with inflation.
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1995). Similarly, Bruno and Easterly (1998) reported that the negative relationship
clearly manifests itself only when inflation exceeds 40 percent. These early estimates
were based on combined data across all countries. However, the threshold at which
inflation reduces growth appears to vary between developed and developing countries.
Khan and Senhadji (2001) identify the threshold point at which inflation reduces
economic growth at 1 to 3 percent for developed economies, but the threshold point for
developing countries is between 11 and 12 percent. Pollin and Zhu (2006) find that
higher inflation is associated with moderate gains in GDP growth up to 15-18 percent
inflation, after which growth begins to decline. The results are more robust in developing
countries relative to developed economies. Some researchers have found that the
threshold at which inflation reduces growth is in the single-digits (Ghosh and Phillips,
1998; Burdekin, Denzau, Keil, Sitthiyot, and Willett, 2004).6
What can we conclude from these studies? There is broad consensus that rapid
rates of inflation will have a negative impact on growth, and this turning point will most
likely be reached once inflation exceeds 15 to 20 percent. Only a few studies show that
reducing inflation down to the level typically adopted in inflation targeting regimes will
contribute to stronger growth. Other studies suggest that keeping inflation in this range
actually leads to slower growth. At best, the benefits of maintaining inflation in the lower
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Hodge (2006) presents evidence that, controlling for fixed investment, inflation has a negative impact
on growth in South Africa. However, he uses a linear model which does not allow for threshold effects.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that reducing inflation to the inflation targeting range of 3 to 6 percent will
necessarily be beneficial to South Africa, holding other factors constant. Hadjimichael, et al. (1995) found a
negative impact of inflation (and, surprisingly, a positive effect of the standard deviation of inflation) on
growth in a cross-country study of African economies over a short time period, 1986-1992, and without
controlling of unobserved country-specific effects (apart from broad country groupings). Again – the study
did not attempt to model the non-linearities in this relationship, and cannot shed light on the threshold
effects discussed here.
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single digits are uncertain and there is a possibility it may slow the process of
development.
In some contexts, finding a negative relationship between inflation and growth
should not be surprising. This is not because inflation causes growth to slow down, but
rather because exogenous shocks to the economy (e.g., external price shocks or supplyside shocks) affect both growth and inflation. A crop failure can simultaneously raise
domestic food prices and slow growth. For countries in which agriculture accounts for a
sizeable portion of GDP and food constitutes a significant part of the consumption bundle
on which measures of inflation are based – as in the case for many African countries –
such a shock will lower growth and raise inflation, potentially by a sizeable amount. Such
shocks are often assumed to be transitory, with few long-run consequences. However, the
possibility of hysteresis should not be ignored – short-run shocks may have long-run
consequences. An economic shock may have a dramatic impact on assets and
investments which could have implications for the supply-side of the economy for years
to come. Most of the studies of the impact of inflation on growth do not take these
dynamics into account.
Many studies of the impact of inflation on growth also do not adequately capture
the costs of controlling inflation. For example, many studies include fixed investment (or
the capital stock) as one of the controls in the growth equation, along with inflation and
other explanatory variables. The impact of inflation is estimated holding fixed investment
constant. However, maintaining low rates of inflation often involves changes in other
prices in the economy, e.g., higher real interest rates or an appreciating real exchange
rate. These price changes directly impact investment decisions and, as a consequence,
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long-run growth. However, this effect will not be captured if investment is held constant.
If these relationships are present, then the point at which inflation negatively impacts
growth is likely to be underestimated.
This leads us to one of the principal critiques of inflation targeting: this approach
to monetary policy presumes that maintaining low inflation (often very low rates of
inflation) will necessarily contribute to faster growth and more rapid development. For
this argument to be justified, we must be confident that all the economic costs of inflation
targeting are adequately captured in the analysis. For example, in many developing
countries and emerging markets, maintaining very low inflation rates requires significant
increases in the real interest rate (e.g., Epstein, 2008). High real interest rates may have
negative consequences for growth and development. Accurately measuring all these
effects is not a simple task.
Another channel through which inflation targeting may negatively affect the
trajectory of development is through the real exchange rate and financial volatility
(Galindo and Ros, 2008; Barbosa-Filho, 2008; Cordero, 2008). In economies with
relatively unrestricted capital mobility and reasonably developed capital markets, the
high interest rates associated with inflation targeting often attract inflows of short-term
portfolio investment. Such capital flows can lead to an appreciation of the real exchange
rate, hurting exports and facilitating import penetration. Tradable sectors will be
adversely affected by such an appreciation, leading to a reallocation of resources to the
non-tradable sector. If productivity levels, on average, are lower in the non-tradable
sector, the outcome will be slower growth and delayed industrialization. In addition, the
accumulation of stocks of short-term capital increases the risk of financial fragility. A
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rapid reversal of these flows can lead to a collapse of the currency and, in turn, a broader
economic crisis.
Finally, inflation targeting must be flexible enough to respond differently,
depending on the source of inflation. As noted above, supply-side shocks may
simultaneously reduce growth and raise inflation. Tightening monetary policy in response
to this kind of shock may make the situation worse (as has been noted by Friedman and
Kuttner, 1996). Strict inflation targeting introduces a pro-cyclical bias into monetary
policy for countries in which supply-side inflation is commonplace. The degree of this
bias will depend on the relative importance of supply-side factors in determining inflation
and the amount of discretion monetary authorities are allowed.
None of these critiques of inflation targeting imply that inflation does not matter.
However, they do suggest that central banks should have multiple objectives and a
variety of policy instruments at their disposal to meet those objectives. We can offer a
further caution here, given the topic of this paper: inflation targeting policies have been
primarily developed and implemented in high-income economies. Increasingly, the
framework is being applied to middle-income countries and emerging markets –
including South Africa. However, the existing models of inflation targeting have not been
adapted to the structural realities of low-income countries, including most African
economies, despite Ghana’s recent adoption of the framework. Therefore, it is worth
examining the issues that arise when we consider inflation targeting monetary policy in
the context of sub-Saharan African countries.
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3. Inflation dynamics in sub-Saharan African countries
Any evaluation of the promises and pitfalls of inflation targeting in sub-Saharan
African countries must consider the nature of inflation and its dynamics. The factors that
contribute to inflation, and their relative importance, differ from economy to economy
and depend on institutional arrangements and structural realities.
In panel data studies of inflation dynamics across sub-Saharan African countries,
increases in the growth rate of the money supply, or, alternatively, the gap between
money supply and estimated money demand, has been shown to contribute to inflation
(Thornton, 2008; Barnichon and Peiris, 2008). However, Thornton (2008) presents
findings that suggest that the money supply is significantly more important for explaining
inflation dynamics in high-inflation countries than in low-inflation countries. These
studies indicate that supply-side factors play a role in determining inflation dynamics –
negative shocks to economic growth or lower estimated values for potential GDP raise
inflation rates.7
Country-level studies also shed light on sources of inflationary pressures in
African countries. For example, in Ghana, the growth rate of the money supply (linked to
the financing of public sector debt and an expansion of foreign debt) and structural
supply-side factors (including shocks to the agricultural sector) are two common
explanations for the persistence of high inflation rates from the 1970s through the 1990s,
despite the introduction of stabilization and structural adjustment policies (Aryeetey and
Harrigan, 2000). In a study of inflation dynamics in Ethiopia, high rates of inflation have

7

Barnichon and Peiris (2008) include an estimate of the output gap (potential output minus actual output)
in their regression. The output gap has a positive coefficient, indicating that a fall in potential output will
increase inflation. They also show that changes in rainfall directly affect inflation – another supply-side
factor.
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been linked to agricultural supply shocks and strong inertial dynamics (Loening,
Durevall, Birru, 2009). Others have documented the importance of exchange rate passthrough and the price of imports in influencing inflationary dynamics. For example,
Oladipo (2007) shows that there is significant, albeit imperfect, pass-through for a variety
of products in Nigeria. Therefore, changes in the nominal exchange rate will impact
inflation. Nell (2004) presents evidence suggesting that inflation dynamics in South
Africa have been influenced by imported inflation, particularly after 1987. The
importance of exchange rate pass-through suggests that inflation dynamics would differ
in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime (e.g. the CFA countries) relative to
countries with more flexible exchange rates.
The literature on inflation dynamics in sub-Saharan African countries
demonstrates that there are multiple factors that influence inflation. The domestic money
supply can affect average prices with changes in the money supply coming from policy
decisions (i.e., deliberate choices taken by the central bank) or from other sources (i.e.,
financial inflows linked to capital, external debt, or transfers which enter the domestic
money supply). The nominal exchange rate and imported inflation is a significant factor.
In countries in which foreign exchange reserves are relatively low, demand for foreign
exchange to finance imports can lead to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and
introduce inflationary pressures. External price shocks – e.g., fluctuations in global
energy prices – play a role, as do domestic supply-side shocks. Finally, inflation inertia –
the impact of past inflation on future prices – appears to be important.
Studies of inflation dynamics in African countries tend to focus on a subset of
these factors when exploring the determinants of inflation. Here we examine a broader
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range of variables which capture, to some extent, these different contributions to
inflation. The reason for this exercise is straight-forward: an evaluation of inflation
targeting monetary policy must consider the factors which contribute to inflation in order
to reach an informed conclusion. Inflation targeting has distinct implications for the
economy, depending on the source of the inflation.
We assemble a panel dataset for sub-Saharan African countries covering the
period 1975-2007. In our initial estimates, we focus on 12 African countries for which we
have relatively complete data (Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, The Gambia, Kenya,
Malawi, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe). This group spans
the broad spectrum of country categories, notably middle-income and low incomecountries, as well as resource-rich and resource-scarce countries. Moreover, we will
consider a broader selection of 29 countries later in the analysis. The panel is unbalanced,
but we impose the restriction that a country must have a minimum of 20 contiguous years
of observations in all variables to be included. The full set of variables for the initial 12country panel are: the annual inflation rate (based on the consumer price index), the
growth rate of the money supply (M2), the percent change in the food production index
(to capture agricultural supply-side shocks), the percentage change in the nominal
exchange rate, the percentage change in the terms of trade index, the percentage change
in the nominal lending rate, and the change in government consumption expenditures as a
percentage of GDP. All data come from the World Bank’s African Development
Indicators. Table 1 summarizes the variables included in the analysis.
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Table 1. Description of variables.
Variable
Description
inft
Annual inflation rate based on national
CPI
gdpt
Annual growth rate of real GDP

Source
African Development Indicators,
2008-9.
African Development Indicators,
2008-9.
Annual growth rate of the money supply African Development Indicators,
(M2)
2008-9.
Natural logarithm of nominal exchange African Development Indicators,
rate(per $US), first difference
2008-9.
Natural logarithm of food production
African Development Indicators,
index, first difference
2008-9.
Natural logarithm of terms of trade
African Development Indicators,
index, first difference
2008-9.
Natural logarithm of prime lending rate, African Development Indicators,
first difference
2008-9. IMF International
Financial Statistics.
Natural logarithm of government
African Development Indicators,
consumption expenditure as % of GDP, 2008-9.
first difference

m2t
xcht
fdt
tott
intt
govt

A fixed effects model is used in all the estimations of the general form:
K

π jt = ∑ β k X j ,t −k + ε j + μ jt

[1]

k =0

in which π jt is the inflation rate in time period ‘t’ for country ‘j’, β k is a vector of
coefficients on the explanatory variables (lagged ‘k’ periods), K is a scalar indicating the
maximum lag length, X jt is a matrix of explanatory variables, εj is the error component of
country ‘j’, and μ jt is a stochastic error term. We also estimate a dynamic version of the
model which includes lagged endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the
equation:
L

K

l =1

k =0

π jt = ∑ α l π j ,t −l + ∑ β k X j ,t −k + ε j + μ jt

[2]
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In the above expression, α l is the coefficient on the inflation rate, lagged l periods, L
indicates the lag length for the endogenous regressor, and K is the lag length for the other
explanatory variables.
In the dynamic specification of the model, with lagged inflation rates on the right
hand side, the lagged endogenous variable is correlated with the error component, εj. If
OLS is used to estimate the model, the endogeneity of the lagged regressor could bias the
estimates.8 Therefore, we estimate the model using both OLS and instrumental variable
techniques (two-stage least squares). We need to identify an instrument that is correlated
with the lagged regressor, but is not correlated with the error term. We propose using
lagged values of the first differences of the inflation rate.9 By taking first differences of
the inflation rate, we eliminate the error component term. In the estimates presented here,
the inflation rate was lagged only one period (longer lagged structures did not improve
the estimates). Therefore, the first difference of the inflation rate lagged two periods was
used as an instrument in the IV estimations.
In addition, we have included the growth rate of GDP as an explanatory variable.
However, as has already been discussed, inflation rates may have an impact on economic
growth. Therefore, we also present estimates in which the growth rate is treated as an
endogenous variable. Again, instrumental variable estimation is used, but with a broader
8

In the panel data used, the number of cross-sections (K) is relatively fixed, but the time dimension
would increase as new data becomes available. The relevant asymptotic properties of the model are those in
which K is fixed but T ´∞. As T becomes larger and larger, the bias associated with the lagged
endogenous variable will approach zero.
9
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM technique for estimation of dynamic panel models.
Variations on this approach have been developed. However, these estimators were developed for models in
which the number of cross sections is large and the time series dimension is limited. The number of
instruments used by the Arellano and Bond estimator increases significantly with T. This can create a
problem of an excessive number of instruments. If the instruments are weak, the estimations will be of poor
quality and potentially biased. Given that our sample includes a small number of countries (small K) but
quite a large number of years (large T), we chose a different approach here in which we are more
parsimonious in the number of instruments used and test for the validity of the instruments are applied.
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set of instruments. We include three instruments for the GDP growth rate, drawing from
the extensive empirical literature on the determinants of growth: the population growth
rate, the initial value of real per capita GDP, expressed in $US, for each decade (1970,
1980, 1990, 2000), and a dummy variable indicating whether the country experienced a
drought in any particular year.10
The results of this analytical exercise are presented in Table 2. In all cases, robust
White standard errors accounting for the presence of heteroskedasticity are reported.
Equation 1 is a simple fixed-effects model, estimated using standard OLS techniques,
which does not include lagged inflation on the right-hand side. The growth rate of M2 has
a significant impact on inflation as does the nominal exchange rate (in this case, an
increase in the exchange rate indicates a depreciation). Note that the money supply and
nominal exchange rate are both expressed in annual percentage changes. The sum of the
coefficients on the exchange rate variables is larger than the sum of the coefficients on
the money supply variables. This would indicate that a 10 percent depreciation of the
exchange rate would have a larger impact, holding other factors constant, than a 10
percent increase in the growth rate of the money supply. The results suggest that supply
side factors are important – changes in food production, lagged one period, have an
impact on current inflation. The sign on the GDP growth rate is negative, but is not
statistically significant. The terms of trade index, the prime lending rate, and government
consumption spending are all insignificant.

10

As pointed out already, a drought can affect domestic prices, raising some question as to whether it
would make a good instrument in this case. We assume that a drought would impact inflation through its
impact on the supply-side of the economy – that is, by affecting GDP growth – and therefore helps identify
the supply-side impact on inflation.
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Table 2. Determinants of inflation in African countries, coefficient estimates of fixed
effects empirical model (1975-2007), unless otherwise indicated, robust standard errors
are presented in parenthesis.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS
OLS
IV
IV
IV
IV

---

0.630*
(0.032)
-0.352
(0.387)
0.031*
(0.005)
0.023*
(0.009)
0.721*
(0.214)
-0.268
(0.220)
0.162
(0.133)
-0.114**
(0.055)
0.016
(0.21)
-0.138
(0.095)
8.224
(7.31)
0.960
(0.802)
---

---

---

23.32
(p<0.01)
---

12
321
0.75

12
319
0.84

12
313
0.80

---

inft-1

-0.385
(0.416)
0.051*
(0.007)
0.034**
(0.017)
0.937*
(0.310)
0.200*
(0.052)
0.261*
(0.080)
-0.142*
(0.061)
-0.005
(0.081)
-0.087
(0.123)
9.145
(5.34)

gdpt
m2t
m2t-1
xcht
xcht-1
xcht-2
fdt-1
tott
intt-1
govt-1
Constant
UnderIdentification
Hansen J stat
Countries
N
R2

0.636*
(0.193)
-0.331
(0.242)
0.032
(0.023)
0.023
(0.017)
0.720*
(0.282)
-0.273**
(0.147)
0.163**
(0.087)
-0.117**
(0.064)
0.023
(0.059)
-0.140**
(0.076)
9.384
(6.392)
---

0.737*
(0.161)
-1.117**
(0.672)
0.033
(0.024)
0.017
(0.014)
0.658*
(0.245)
-0.353*
(0.156)
0.133
(0.099)
-0.145*
(0.073)
0.033
(0.065)
-0.148*
(0.074)
7.021
(7.55)
---

0.747*
(0.165)
-1.114**
(0.686)
0.033
(0.024)
0.017
(0.013)
0.653*
(0.245)
-0.358*
(0.159)
0.134
(0.101)
-0.155*
(0.080)
---

0.672*
(0.249)
-1.047
(0.736)
0.043
(0.032)
0.023
(0.016)
0.541*
(0.205)
-0.135
(0.185)
0.051
(0.105)
-0.162**
(0.093)
---

-0.152*
(0.075)
---

-0.181*
(0.082)
---

---

---

22.36
(p<0.01)
2.49
(p=0.29)
12
313
0.79

23.01
(p<0.01)
2.42
(p=0.30)
12
313
0.79

25.27
(p<0.01)
0.817
(p=0.66)
16
412
0.69

Notes: * signifies statistical significance at the 5% level. ** signifies significance at the 10% level.
In Equation 3, the first differences of the inflation rate, lagged two periods, was used as an instrument for
the lagged inflation rate (the estimated model is exactly identified). In Equations 4 to 6, the lagged inflation
rate and the gdp growth rate are both assumed endogenous. The instruments used to estimate these
equations were the two-period lag of the first difference of the inflation rate, the population growth rate,
the initial gdp (in real $US) at the start of each decade, and a dummy variable indicating whether the
country experienced a drought in that year.

Equation 2 presents OLS estimates of the model when the lagged inflation rate is
included as an explanatory variable. The strong positive coefficient on the lagged
endogenous variable suggests that inertial inflation is an important phenomenon in the
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African countries included in this analysis. The results are broadly similar to those
obtained in Equation (1) – money supply and the nominal exchange rate are both
significant, with the sum of the coefficients on the exchange rate variables still larger
than those on the money supply growth rates. In addition, supply-side shocks, in terms of
food production, remain important.
However, as we have noted, using OLS to estimate a dynamic panel model may
yield biased coefficients due to the endogeneity of the lagged regressor. Therefore,
Equation 3 presents estimates obtained using the lagged first differences of the inflation
rate as an instrument. A number of changes in the results can be observed. The
coefficients on the money supply variables are of the same magnitude as in Equation 1,
but they are not statistically significant. However, Wald tests of the sum of the
coefficients indicate that the total effect is significantly different from zero (with a pvalue of 0.08). The nominal exchange rate retains its statistical significance and the sum
of the coefficients is still statistically different from zero (p-value = 0.04) and larger in
magnitude than the sum of the coefficients on the money supply variables. The
coefficient on the prime lending rate is also significantly negative.11
Equation (4) presents instrumental variable estimates when the GDP growth rate
is treated as endogenous. The coefficient on GDP growth remains negative, but becomes
statistically significant. This suggests that instrumental variable estimation is needed to
identify general supply-side effects. Lagged food production shocks are still treated
separately and are significant (the separate treatment is important because of the
importance of agriculture in most of the countries analyzed here and the importance of
11

The impact of nominal interest rates on inflation is ambiguous. If interest payments are a large share of
production costs and mark-up pricing is practiced, higher nominal interest rates may be associated with
higher prices. However, if higher interest rates restrict demand, a negative impact would be observed.
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food prices in measurements of inflation). The coefficient on the lagged inflation rate is
somewhat higher than in other estimates,

indicating that inertial effects remain

important. Finally, the coefficients on the money supply, the nominal exchange rate, and
the prime lending rate are similar to Equation 3.
The use of instrumental variable estimation techniques raises questions about the
validity of the instruments used. We present two tests of instrument validity in Table 2.
We reject the Anderson LM test statistic of underidentification, indicating that the
instruments identify the model. The Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions fails to
reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that our instruments are not correlated with the error
term and have been correctly excluded from the specification. These two tests suggest
that our instrument set is reasonably valid.
Throughout all these estimates, the coefficients on government consumption
spending and the terms of trade index have not been significant. Equation 5 presents
estimates when these two variables are dropped. The results are similar to those already
described for Equation 4. When we drop the terms of trade index, we are able to include
four additional countries in the analysis: Cape Verde, the Central African Republic,
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Equation 6 presents estimates, paralleling those of Equation 5,
but including these four countries. The results are broadly consistent with what has
already been discussed: the coefficient on the growth rate of GDP is still negative, but
loses some significance with the added countries; the sum of the coefficients on money
supply is positive, but small; the sum of the coefficients on the nominal exchange rate is
also positive; shocks to food production are significant; and the nominal lending rate has
a negative impact on inflation.
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Dropping the interest rate variable allows us to expand the number of countries
included in the estimation still further – to a total of 29.12 Although dropping the interest
rate changes the specification of the model, we do so to test the robustness of the
estimates. Equation 7 summarizes the results. The magnitude of inertial inflation
increases significantly in these results. The growth rate retains its negative sign, but is not
significant. Food production shocks still have a significant impact of inflationary
dynamics, suggesting that supply-side factors remain important. Although the sums of the
coefficients on the exchange rate and the money supply growth rate remain positive,
neither sum is significant at the 10 percent level.
Two countries included in the estimates of Equation 7 – Ghana and Sudan –
appear to have unusually high levels of inertial inflation, so much so their inclusion
affects the estimates for the entire panel. Equation 8 replicates the estimates of Equation
7, but without Ghana and Sudan. The level of inertial inflation drops significantly, and is
comparable to other estimates (e.g. Equations 4 and 5). The sums of the coefficients on
the money supply growth and exchange rate variables are positive, and significantly
different from zero at the 10 percent level. Other coefficient estimates are similar to those
obtained in equations that included the interest rate and terms of trade variables.
Therefore, we are confident that our estimates are reasonably robust, acknowledging that
some countries in sub-Saharan Africa exhibit distinct inflation dynamics.
This empirical exercise is useful in providing a sense of the determinants of
inflation in African countries and the relative importance of different variables. However,
12

The full set of countries include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Lesotho, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Although data is available for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, its inclusion produced unstable estimation results.
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some caveats should be kept in mind. Perhaps most importantly, like most fixed effects
analysis, the coefficients are restricted to be identical across countries. This assumption
allows us to pool observations and to generate estimates with greater statistical precision.
Nevertheless, in formulating monetary policy for any particular country, such an
approach is not a substitute for careful analysis of inflation dynamics in the economy in
question.
One of the strongest results from this analysis is that exchange rates are important
variables to consider in an analysis of inflation dynamics in sub-Saharan African
countries. What implications does this have for inflation targeting? If we consider a strict
inflation targeting regime with substantial exchange rate pass-through, then policy
makers will have to target exchange rates, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to reach
the inflation target. To some degree, inflation targeting becomes exchange rate targeting.
This introduces tensions between efforts to meet an inflation target and interventions to
manage the exchange rate. A recent study of inflation targeting regimes in emerging
markets found that inflation-targeting countries are actually pursing a mixed strategy –
responding to both inflation rates and real exchange rates (Aizenman, Hutchison, and
Noy, 2008). This same study found that emerging markets without an inflation targeting
regime tended to respond more strongly to the real exchange rate. This raises a number of
issues for further investigation: is the exchange rate that is consistent with the inflation
target also the exchange rate that is consistent with industrialization and long-run
development? If not, is it possible to reconcile an inflation-targeting regime with one that
attempts to manage exchange rates to support developmental outcomes?
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The importance of exchange rates also raises concerns about the level of foreign
reserves a country should maintain, if it is to consistently meet its inflation target. Epstein
and Yeldan (2008) present evidence suggesting that many countries have accumulated
larger stocks of foreign exchange reserves after adopting an inflation targeting regime.
One explanation is that these reserves may be needed in order to defend the currency and
control inflation if the economic environment changes in a way that could lead to a
depreciation. Maintaining excess reserves can be costly, particularly for African countries
with a structural dependence on key imported goods. In the context of a global economic
crisis like the one which began in 2008, maintaining an adequate stock of foreign
reserves becomes even more challenging when prices of exports fall dramatically and
capital inflows become scarcer.
Researchers in Latin America raise concerns that inflation targeting has lead to
over-valued exchange rates (e.g., Galindo and Ros, 2008; Barbosa-Filho, 2008). In these
cases, the high interest rates needed to keep inflation low attract short-term capital
inflows which can lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. For many subSaharan African countries, with underdeveloped capital markets, these risks may not yet
be evident. However, as capital markets deepen and expand, this could become an
important issue in the near future. South Africa has confronted the challenge of a reversal
in short-term capital flows in the context of an inflation targeting regime. It is important
to consider the lessons from this experience when weighing the pros and cons of inflation
targeting in other African countries.
In our results, monetary aggregates – specifically the growth rate of M2 – do not
have as strong of an impact on inflation as do nominal exchange rates. This does not
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mean that the money supply is unimportant. However, it may indicate that changes in the
money supply impact inflation through their influence on other variables. Clearly, the
nominal exchange rate is a possible candidate. Increases in the growth rate of the
domestic money supply can lead to currency depreciation and, as a result, higher prices
for imported goods and for domestic products that can be traded internationally. In this
case, the impact of the money supply does not operate through traditional demand-pull
mechanisms, in which excess domestic demand relative to limited productive capacity
raises prices. Also, as previously mentioned, Thornton (2008) found that the money
supply was more important in explaining inflation in African countries with high rates of
inflation (e.g., above 30 percent) than in countries with lower rates of inflation. Rapid
growth of monetary aggregates explains excessive inflation in sub-Saharan Africa, but is
less important in explaining moderate inflation.
The estimates presented here also indicate that supply-side factors play a role in
determining inflation. As discussed earlier, strict inflation targeting in the context of
supply-side inflation implies that monetary policy will have a pro-cyclical bias. This bias
can be minimized if monetary authorities have sufficient discretion in the conduct of
monetary policy to modify their reactions based on the source of inflation. For African
countries, flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy has often been restricted due to
agreements with the International Monetary Fund in the context of the IMF’s lending
programs. For example, the restrictions associated with the IMF’s financial programming
model may not always be appropriate for many low-income countries (Easterly, 2002).
Therefore, when evaluating policy of inflation targeting, the amount of ‘constrained
discretion’ which will be allowed in practice is an important consideration.
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4. Experiences with inflation targeting in Africa: South Africa and Ghana
Two countries in sub-Saharan Africa currently have inflation targeting regimes:
South Africa and Ghana. We consider these two cases briefly here. South Africa formally
announced that it would adopt inflation targeting in 2000. Therefore, we can examine its
record with regard to actual inflation, inflation targets, and other macroeconomic
variables over a period of approximately one decade.13 Ghana adopted inflation targeting
in 2007. Therefore, the time period over which we can examine trends since the advent of
inflation targeting is much shorter. Therefore, our discussion of the Ghanaian case will be
provisional.

South Africa
South Africa’s target range for inflation is 3 percent to 6 percent. When inflation
targeting was introduced in 2000, it was decided that a modified version of the consumer
price index – the CPIX – would be used to calculate inflation rates. The CPIX excludes
the financing component of housing costs (i.e., mortgage interest payments). The reason
for excluding mortgage interest from the CPI is that most South African mortgages are
flexible rate mortgages – when the market interest rate rises, so does the mortgage
payment. If these dynamics affected the measurement of price inflation, then the central
bank could, in theory at least, respond to increases in market interest rates by increasing
its policy rate (i.e., the repo rate in South Africa) – that is, the central bank would
exacerbate the increase in interest rates. As of January 2009, the practice of maintaining

13

Although South Africa announced that it would begin inflation targeting in 2000, the implementation
of the policy effectively began in 2002.
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separate price indices (the CPI and the CPIX) was discontinued, and the current CPI is
defined analogously to the earlier CPIX.
The policy of inflation targeting was announced in February 2000. If we focus on
the 36 quarters from the third quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2009, average
quarterly inflation was within the 3 to 6 percent range for 14 of these quarters. Roughly
speaking, the Reserve Bank of South Africa was able to meet its target about half the
time since announcing the policy of inflation targeting. The period from the fourth
quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2007 was the most successful in terms of keeping
inflation within the targeted range. This period was also marked by relatively strong
economic performance and higher average rates of GDP growth, compared to earlier
years in the post-apartheid era.
Figure 1 shows inflation rates (measured as annual rates and based on the CPIX)
from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2009. The figure also shows trends
in the real prime lending rate and an index of the real effective exchange rate over the
same period. In terms of inflation trends, we can identify two inflationary periods in the
period since the introduction of inflation targeting: the period spanning the second quarter
of 2002 to the second quarter of 2003 and the period beginning in the fourth quarter of
2007.
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Figure 1. Inflation rates (CPIX), real prime lending rates, and index of the real exchange
rate in South Africa, 2000-2009.
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The first inflationary period corresponded to a rapid depreciation of the rand,
linked to a sudden increase in the outflow of short-term capital. The Reserve Bank did
not attempt to control this inflationary spike by dramatically increasing real interest rates
or by attempting to defend the value of the rand, as had occurred during an earlier
inflationary shock (1997-8) caused by a depreciation (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007). The
cost of trying to meet the inflation target was judged greater than the benefits of a
sizeable intervention. In the second inflationary period, beginning at the end of 2007,
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increases in global food and energy prices contributed to the highest rates of inflation in
the inflation targeting period. Again, real interest rates were not raised in an effort to
bring inflation down into the target range.
This suggests that the Reserve Bank of South Africa enjoys a high degree of
discretion in terms of which policies to pursue at what time in order to manage inflation.
The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement of 2003 states this explicitly, as pointed out
by Aron and Muellbauer (2007):

‘When the economy is buffeted by a supply-side shock similar to those
envisaged by the original escape clause that will take inflation outside of
the target range (e.g., an oil price shock, a drought, a natural disaster, or
financial contagion affecting the currency), at the subsequent meeting of
the MPC [Monetary Policy Committee], the SARB [South African
Reserve Bank] will fully inform the public of the nature of the ‘shock’ …
and the monetary policy response.’

This policy was clearly put into practice during the first decade of inflation targeting in
South Africa.
Although the Reserve Bank did not dramatically raise real interest rates or attempt
to defend the real exchange rate during these inflationary episodes, it does not mean that
the inflation targeting policy imposed few costs on the economy. Real interest rates were
not raised in response to an unexpected depreciation or the external price shocks, but, as
Figure 1 indicates, they did remain high throughout this period. Studies of the South
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African economy during the inflation targeting period suggest that the benefits in terms
of growth and employment may have been greater if interest rates could have been
reduced (Epstein, 2008).
Similarly, during the period in which the inflation target was met (roughly 2003 to
the beginning of 2007), the index of the real effective exchange rate was higher compared
to other quarters (i.e., the real exchange rate appreciated somewhat). We cannot judge
from these simple trends whether the rand is at risk of being over-valued as a result of
inflation targeting. Indeed, the index of the real effective exchange rate was higher still in
several of the years immediately preceding the introduction of inflation targeting – when
the Reserve Bank aimed to keep inflation low and more forcefully defended the value of
the rand. Nevertheless, an appreciating exchange rate may be cause for concern in that it
could reduce export competitiveness and intensify import penetration.
Has the inflation targeting regime in South Africa influenced expectations? This
is a difficult question to answer accurately, given the short time frame in which the policy
has been in place, the deviations from the inflation targets caused by external shocks and
currency depreciation, and the challenge of accurately measuring expectations. A recent
study by Rossouw and Padayachee (2009) explored the factors that influence inflation
credibility and expectations in South Africa. They found that perceptions of how well the
government is able to control inflation are linked to the actual rate of inflation, not a
stated inflation target. Their analysis also suggests that expectations may be formed over
the long-run. The authors discuss the results of pilot surveys that indicate individuals do
not have a strong basis for understanding whether the official inflation rate is an accurate
picture of price increases and that ‘inflation figures are not generally accepted by a
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representative sample of South Africans as an accurate indication of price increases’ (p.
326). Aron and Muellbauer (2007), in a review of monetary policy in South Africa, cite
evidence that inflation expectations, particularly in wage setting, appear to be historically
based, and are often not forward-looking. These findings would indicate that expectations
among South African will be difficult to shift simply by announcing a target range of
inflation.
The same study by Aron and Muellbauer (2007) also documents significant
improvements in the transparency of monetary policy after the implementation of
inflation targeting. Better transparency, however, does not translate directly into being
able to influence expectations or to increase the perceived credibility of central bank
policy. The research on expectations and credibility in South Africa raises a number of
issues that are relevant for other sub-Saharan African countries. In countries with strong
regional variations, is a single inflation target a meaningful indicator of price changes as
they are experienced? Are inflation targets meaningful to the people whose expectations
the policy is trying to influence?
Since the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, the South African
Reserve Bank has shown flexibility and pragmatism in responding to the impact of the
crisis (Kasekende, Brixiova, and Ndikumana 2010). Adherence to strict rules under the
inflation targeting regime has taken a back seat while the Reserve Bank and Treasury
focused on protecting employment and incomes by supporting industry and domestic
activity in general. For example, the government adopted a countercyclical fiscal
stimulus amounting to R 787 billion (about USD 100 billion) to finance public
investment during 2010-12. The Reserve Bank continued to ease monetary policy since
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December 2008, despite the fact that inflation crossed the 6% upper bound of the
inflation targeting range, in an effort to curb the fall in output as the country experienced
a recession for the first time in decades. More recently, in a surprise move, the Reserve
Bank announced further exchange controls liberalization measures to help curb the
appreciation of the rand in order to support export-oriented sectors. The lesson is that it
would be counterproductive to enforce a rigid inflation targeting regime in the context of
severe exogenous shocks. More generally, any policy regime must be implemented with
an adequate dose of flexibility and pragmatism.

Ghana
Ghana officially adopted inflation targeting in May of 2007. The range of
inflation for the initial period of inflation targeting was set at 7 to 9 percent with the
target range jointly determined by the Bank of Ghana and the government (Amoah and
Mumuni, 2008). The measurement of prices used to target inflation excludes petroleum
prices and utilities. The reason for excluding these components is that energy prices can
be quite volatile and clearly represents a non-monetary source of inflationary pressures.
Excluding the energy component from the CPI does not entirely eliminate the influence
of changes in energy prices on inflation. For example, in a study of the component of the
CPI for Kenya, using a vector autoregression (VAR) model, Pollin, Githinji, and Heintz
(2008) show that a shock to energy prices impacts other components of the CPI. These
kinds of interrelationships will likely be evident in other African economies. Although
energy shocks cannot be entirely purged from the CPI, excluding these components
would mute their influence on the targeted inflation rate.
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The short time period that inflation targeting has been in operation in Ghana
makes any evaluation of the policy at this time extremely tentative. In the years
immediately preceding the formal adoption of inflation targeting, the Bank of Ghana had
attempted to reduce inflation to single digits. Although it is too early to tell how inflation
targeting is working, we can examine recent trends in inflation in order to better
understand the dynamics of the average price level.
Figure 2 shows quarterly inflation rates (on an annual basis) from the first quarter
of 2000 to the second quarter of 2009. During this period, we observe two spikes in
inflation – one in late 2000 to the first half of 2001 and a second one in 2003. Several
factors contributed to the earlier spike in inflation – higher petroleum prices, slower
growth in agricultural production, and a terms of trade shock which put downward
pressure on the cedi. The second shock in 2003 can be explained almost entirely by
changes in the administrated price policy for petroleum, which led to rapid increases in
the domestic price level.14 Apart from these two spikes, average inflation rates generally
fluctuated between 9 and 15 percent during this period. This is significantly lower than
the persistently high rates of inflation which Ghana had experienced in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s.

14

These reforms were associated with efforts to deal with the on-going problems of the Tema Oil
Refinery, including unsustainable levels of debt.
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Figure 2. Inflation rates (CPI) in Ghana, 2000-2009.
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Ghana introduced inflation targeting at the same time that the pressure on food
and fuel prices began to intensify. Beginning in 2007, we see another upward trend in
inflation tied to the global rise in energy and food prices. This created a significant
challenge for keeping inflation within the target range. When inflation targeting was
introduced in 2007, the prime lending rate, determined by the Bank of Ghana, was set at
14.5 percent. The prime rate has been increased since that time in response to growing
inflationary pressures and, at the time of this writing, stands at 18.5 percent. During this
same time period, the inflation rate doubled, from approximately 10 percent in 2007 to 20
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percent in the first two quarters of 2009. Therefore, the increase in the nominal rate was
not proportionate to the increase in inflation (i.e., the real prime rate has declined).
According to Amoah and Mumuni (2008), the processes of transparency and
accountability in Ghana differ from those in other inflation targeting countries. When the
inflation target is missed, the Bank of Ghana does not produce an open letter or formal
report explaining the deviation. However, the Bank of Ghana conducts press releases
after monetary policy committee meetings, publishes routine reports, and maintains
information on its website. Through these channels the Bank communicates its policy
decisions with the public. It is unknown how effective these means of communication are
in influencing expectations and enhancing policy credibility.
Ghana’s inflation dynamics are strongly influenced by external factors: supplyside shocks, external price shocks (or, in the case of petroleum prices, price shocks linked
to domestic policy reform), and changes in the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, many
of the concerns discussed earlier in this paper apply to Ghana. Specifically, it will be
important for the Bank of Ghana to maintain a high degree of discretion within its
inflation targeting framework in order to rationally manage the costs of inflation
reduction in the face of external shocks. Indeed, the Bank of Ghana has shown flexibility
in managing monetary policy in the context of the crisis. In particular, it has shown great
patience in the face of rising inflation, which broke the 20 percent mark over the summer
2009. Thus, monetary policy in the context of the crisis has been guided by discretion and
flexibility rather than adherence to strict inflation targeting rules; and this has helped the
economy to weather the storm.
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5. Inflation targeting and the global economic crisis in Africa
The economic turmoil that engulfed the world’s economies towards the end of
2008 has changed the macroeconomic environment fundamentally. The crisis had its
origins in the financial markets of the U.S. and other high-income countries. In subSaharan Africa, the crisis has not affected domestic financial and banking sectors to a
similar degree. The crisis in Africa is one of declining trade flows, a collapse of
commodity prices, reduced access to international private financing (including trade
finance), falling government revenues, reductions in remittances, and, to some extent,
uncertainty about future commitments of official development assistance (ODA).
In terms of inflationary dynamics, two opposing forces are at work. On the one
hand, the steep rise in global prices of 2007 and the first half of 2008 has not continued
and has begun to reverse itself. Therefore, external pressures on the price of fuel and food
have weakened considerably and, in many countries, have reduced inflationary pressures.
On the other hand, many countries with floating exchange rates have experienced some
degree of depreciation due to adverse terms of trade movements, declines in financial
flows (such as remittances) and falling exports. These changes in nominal exchange rates
add to inflationary pressures. The net impact on inflation is uncertain and depends on the
structure of individual economies and the exchange rate regime in place.
Although domestic banking sectors in Africa have not come under pressure to the
same degree as the financial sectors in many other countries, with the exception of the
Nigerian banking sector15, the financial crisis has had substantial impact on access to

15

The global credit crunch affected Nigerian banks, which faced difficulties obtaining trade credit lines in
the United States and in Europe. In August 2009 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) injected funds into the
banking system, when five leading Nigerian banks posted losses from non-performing loans due to
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finance throughout the continent. External lines of credit have been closed or limited. For
financing of trade (especially imports), borrowers have turned to domestic institutions.
Access to sovereign debt has also dried up; governments have had to postpone planned
floating of sovereign bonds on the international markets (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda;
see AfDB 2009c). This creates an increased demand for foreign exchange at a time when
foreign exchange earnings are already coming under pressure. The result is further
pressure on exchange rates and, as a consequence, additional inflationary impetus.
Although only Ghana and South Africa are implementing inflation targeting, it is
useful to consider how inflation targeting would operate in the context of the current
crisis. A strict, rules-based inflation targeting regime would attempt to meet its target by
raising interest rates and intervening into the foreign exchange market to support the
currency. Given that the crisis is already having a significant negative impact on growth
and exports, such a reaction would likely worsen the situation in Africa. Moreover, as
foreign exchange reserves come under pressure, the cost of defending the domestic
currency, by using precious reserves, increases.
However, as we have repeatedly discussed, in practice, inflation targeting often
allows a fairly large degree of discretion on the part of monetary policymakers. In South
Africa, the repurchase rate (the policy rate) was raised in response to higher rates of
inflation, beginning in 2007, but has since come down in 2009. Similarly, in Ghana, as
we have noted, the prime lending rate has been raised, but not enough to constitute a hike
in real interest rates. Similarly, both countries experienced a depreciation in their nominal
exchange rates with the onset of the financial crisis. However, instead of defending the

excessive lending to the energy sector and the burst of the stock market. The sector has stabilized thanks to
the swift response by the CBN.
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currency at all costs, both inflation targeting regimes allowed inflation to climb outside of
their target ranges (Kasekende, Brixiova, and Ndikumana 2010).
The global economic crisis demonstrates some of the risks attached to inflation
targeting and underscores the importance of allowing policymakers sufficient discretion
in considering other factors when choosing the best course of action.

6. Alternatives to inflation targeting?
Is inflation targeting the right monetary policy for the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa to realize the goals of economic development, stability, equitable and rising living
standards, and poverty reduction? This paper has argued that a strict inflation targeting
regime – a rules-based system with little discretion – is not desirable. Given inflationary
dynamics, strict inflation targeting could produce perverse policy responses to production
and price shocks. It may also force economies to defend an exchange rate which may not
be conducive to long-run growth and diversification of production.
However, many advocates of inflation targeting do not see the approach as
constituting a set of inflexible rules. Instead, an inflation targeting regime should be
characterized as a framework which allows for ‘constrained discretion’ – central banks
are not free to follow any whim in managing monetary policy, but they also must not be
tied to an absolute inflation target that ignores other factors at play. Bernanke, and his coauthors, make this point in a 1999 study of inflation targeting:

‘… the idea that monetary policy literally has no other goals than to
control inflation would find little support from the public, from central
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bankers, or from monetary economists … given that governments and
central banks do care about production, employment, exchange rates, and
other variables besides inflation, treating inflation targeting as an ironclad
policy rule could lead to very poor economic outcomes.’ (p. 21)

Interpreting inflation targeting as a flexible system for conducting monetary
policy, one that takes into account the whole macroeconomic picture, raises an important
question. If inflation targeting must take into account a broad spectrum of economic
variables when formulating monetary policy, what really differentiates inflation targeting
monetary policy from sensible macroeconomic management which incorporates a dual
concern for supporting solid performance of the real economy and managing inflation in
a sustainable manner?
The distinction is the weight put on inflation in determining any monetary policy
response and the presumed role of central bank policy in influencing long-run
development. Under an inflation targeting regime, the primary goal of monetary policy is
price stability, particularly in the medium- to long-run, and that all other goals must be
subordinated to this objective as long as allowance is made for short-run stabilization
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 2007). Even here there is some ambiguity over what is meant by
‘price stability’ (e.g., does maintaining stable inflation at a predictable 10-12 percent
constitute price stability or must price stability try to achieve an inflation rate close to
zero?) Putting aside the issue of the precise definition of price stability, we can pose
another fundamental question: should price stability be the overriding goal of monetary
policy in order to support economic development in Africa?
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One alternative to inflation targeting would be to pursue a monetary policy that
sees the central bank as an agency of development, one that formulates policy to support
the performance of the real economy (Epstein 2007). The primary long-run objective of
monetary policy would no longer be price stability, but rather economic growth,
employment growth, or some other real outcome that would serve as an indicator of
economic development. The monetary policy regime would identify variables that could
be targeted in the short-run in order to meet the long-run goals associated with economic
development. These short-run targets would complement inflation management goals as
the guiding indicators that would direct monetary policy, albeit within a context of
‘constrained discretion’. In the analysis associated with inflation-targeting, monetary
policy decisions are assumed to have no long-run consequences for output or
employment, although short-run trade-offs may exist. However, if we consider that prices
such as interest rates and exchange rates do affect investment and can have long-run
consequences for development, then real targeting alternatives have the potential to
improve economic outcomes.
The growth rate could be one such target. The idea would be to keep policy
interest rates within a range that encourages investment and growth and does not lead to
excessive inflation. This approach would include a consideration of inflation in the
conduct of monetary policy, since the emphasis would be on maintaining positive real
interest rates (i.e., excessive rates of inflation would violate this constraint). Bernanke et
al. (1999) suggest that a monetary policy regime which targets the nominal GDP growth
rate, for example, would operate quite similarly to an inflation targeting regime with
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sufficient discretionary scope to address economic objectives other than inflation.16 The
difference with the growth target is that it would place more emphasis on real economic
performance than would an inflation targeting approach.
Others have argued that instead of real interest rates, central banks should target
the real exchange rate, so as to maintain exchange rates at a competitive level, consistent
with long-run growth and development (Frenkel and Taylor, 2006). This would mean
intervening, as required, in foreign exchange markets to maintain a competitive rate.
Again, inflation would be incorporated into policy formulation, since rapid increases in
domestic prices would contribute to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
Both these alternative targets – the real interest rate and the real exchange rate – attempt
to strike a balance between inflation control and variables which have an immediate
impact on the performance of the real economy.
Would a ‘real-targeting’ monetary policy support growth and development in
African countries better than an inflation targeting regime? This is difficult to judge for
two reasons. First, we do not yet have an accurate picture of all the costs and benefits of
inflation targeting in African countries. More research needs to be done. Moreover, an
evaluation of inflation targeting should, ideally, be compared to other approaches to
monetary policy (Epstein and Yeldan, 2008). Second, and equally important, the success
of an alternative to inflation targeting critically depends on the institutional setting in
which the policy operates. In the African context, the role of institutions is of the upmost
importance.

16

Some of the reasons that Bernanke et al. (1999) give for not focusing on nominal GDP growth as a
monetary target is that (1) people may not understand nominal GDP growth in terms of formulating
expectations and (2) data on GDP is produced less frequently than data on prices, making it more difficult
to formulate immediate responses to changing economic conditions.
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Consider an alternative monetary policy which targets real interest rates at a low
and positive level. The idea would be to increase the availability of credit in the banking
system and lower its cost, thereby encouraging investment and laying the foundation for
long-run growth. However, the success of this strategy rests on a critical assumption: that
the banking sector will allocate the additional credit in such a way as to support
productive investments. In many African countries, the banking sector is characterized by
excess liquidity and a shortage of stable long-term resources for extending credit to
finance long-term investment (Sacerdoti, 2005; Mkandawire, 1999; Steele et al., 1997). It
is unclear that injecting more liquidity into these banking systems will lead to more
investment. The barrier is not monetary policy, but rather the institutional reality of the
banking sector in which the incentive structure encourages holding high levels of liquid
assets. The reasons for this are various: information asymmetries, lack of capacity in the
banking sector itself (particularly in managing small scale loans), the high rates of return
on short-term government securities, the erosion and collapse of development finance
institutions in many places, and limited information on creditworthiness. Relaxing these
constraints requires financial sector reforms – and these reforms may be a prerequisite for
introducing an effective, alternative monetary policy.
A second institutional issue involves the mobility of financial capital. In a small
open economy with reasonably developed capital markets, targeting interest rates to
support economic growth may encourage short-term capital outflows. Such outflows will
undermine the success of a ‘real-targeting’ approach to monetary policy. A similar set of
concerns are relevant to policies which aim to maintain a competitive real exchange
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rate.17 Under these circumstances, capital management techniques (including capital
controls) will be necessary, if an alternative approach to monetary policy is to be
successful. As the capital markets of African economies deepen, the importance of
managing capital flows to support development and reduce volatility will become
increasingly evident.
A regime that targets real exchange rates would encounter other structural
challenges. In countries whose exports are dominated by primary commodities, global
market prices for these commodities will exert a stronger influence on export
performance and economic growth than the domestic exchange rate. If these countries
also depend on imported inputs into production, then it is unclear whether attempts to
maintain a competitive exchange rate will generate sizeable benefits (relative to countries
whose exports are more diversified and include manufactured products). Again – the
structure of the economy will influence the success of an alternative approach to
monetary policy. This does not imply that the structure should be taken as given, but
rather that policy makers would have to pursue structural reforms in concert with a
developmental macroeconomic policy.
In African countries, the effectiveness of any approach to monetary policy will
depend on these institutional and structural issues. This is true for inflation targeting as
well as any of the ‘real targeting’ alternatives. This issue is often ignored in debates over
which approach to monetary policy is the right one. The choice of monetary regime

17

The notion of a ‘trilemma' postulates that, in an open economy with free capital mobility, a country
cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. Put another
way, global integration limits the policy space available for pursing an independent exchange rate or
monetary policy. The degree to which the trilemma holds in sub-Saharan Africa will vary from country to
country and will depend on the level of financial development and the relative importance of short-term
portfolio capital flows.
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should not be treated as independent from existing institutions and the imperative of
complementary structural reforms. The real question which needs to be asked is which
reforms are needed in Africa to allow monetary policy to play a developmental role and,
once these reforms are effected, which monetary targets are needed to support long-run
development?

7. Concluding remarks
This paper has discussed, in some detail, the challenges of implementing an
inflation targeting monetary policy in African countries and raised some concerns about
the appropriateness of this approach. We summarize a number of observations here:

•

A strict rules-based approach to monetary policy, including inflation targeting, is
not desirable for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, given inflation dynamics
and structural realities. Any monetary policy should include sufficient scope for
discretion to allow the central bank to respond to shocks, especially those
originating from the supply side.

•

Rapid rates of inflation will undermine economic development. Therefore,
management of inflationary pressures is desirable and must be a component of
any monetary policy regime. However, the benefits and costs of maintaining very
low rates of inflation are unclear. Subordinating other economic goals to inflation
reduction is not desirable when the cost of doing so is large.
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•

Inflation targeting incorporates critical principles of transparency and
accountability in the formulation of monetary policy. These principles are
important to maintain within any approach to monetary policy.

•

The determinants of inflationary expectations in African economies are not well
understood. This is an area for future research.

•

The exchange rate is an important macroeconomic variable for African countries.
Managing exchange rates is a potentially important policy tool for central banks
(this need not imply that fixed exchange rates are desirable, rather that central
banks see exchange rate management as a policy instrument).

•

The degree to which central banks play a developmental role will be determined
by institutional factors, such as the nature of the banking sector, the scope for
managing capital flows, and the structure of international trade. The choice of
monetary policy regime should not displace the imperative for institutional reform
in policy formulation.

With this summary, we return to the question posed in the title of the paper: is
there a case for formal inflation targeting in sub-Saharan Africa? The answer to this
question is conditional on what the proposed alternatives would be. For example, if we
were to compare inflation-targeting, with its emphasis on transparency and
accountability, with other monetary policy regimes that lack these characteristics and
whose overriding objective is to keep inflation at low levels, then the answer is yes.
Inflation targeting represents an improvement on less transparent inflation-reducing
policy regimes.
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However, the answer is less straight-forward if we compare an inflation-targeting
regime with an alternative monetary policy approach which puts greater emphasis on real
economic outcomes. It is also important to recognize that inflation targeting regimes, in
practice if not in theory, often include significant scope for discretionary responses,
including monetary policies to address potential problems with real economic
performance. In some respects, we are faced with a continuum. On one extreme, in a
strict rules-based inflation targeting framework, all weight would be placed on reaching
the desired inflation target. As we move away from this position, more weight is placed
on real economic variables. Inflation targeting as a framework of ‘constrained discretion’
tends to consider real economic factors only in the context of short-run stabilization. We
have argued in this paper that the conduct of monetary policy in the African context may
also have important implications for long-run development. Can the inflation-targeting
framework be extended to incorporate these considerations? Or does ‘inflation targeting’
lose its core objective if long-run development replaces long-run price stability as the
central objective of central bank policy?
In some respects, this is a matter of semantics – a monetary policy that supports
long-run development would also aim to control inflationary pressures and, in this
respect, would need to manage inflation through transparent and accountable central
banks. One concern is that the inflation targeting framework – even with substantial
discretionary scope – precludes these long-run considerations. If so, a stronger case can
be made for a developmental monetary policy for sub-Saharan African countries, one that
takes into account a number of short-run variables with the ultimate aim of fostering
long-run growth and development.
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Debating the merits of alternative monetary policies should not become an excuse
for moving forward on institutional reforms, particularly financial sector reforms, to
improve the development role of central banks. As we have stressed, the effectiveness of
monetary policy, particularly a monetary policy which aims to support long-run
development, will be determined by the quality of the institutions through which such
policies operate. Monetary policy must be formulated and, when necessary, adjusted
taking into account these institutional and structural realities. In addition, institutional
reform should be seen as a critical component of monetary policy itself. Without
recognizing these interconnections, central banks in Africa will be denied the possibility
of playing a pivotal role in supporting economic development and poverty reduction.
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